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ABSTRACT
We study the effect of Demand-Response (DR) in dynamic
real-time electricity markets. We use a two-stage market
model that takes into account the dynamical aspects of gen-
eration, demand, and DR. We study the real-time market
prices in two scenarios: in the former, consumers anticipate
or delay their flexible loads in reaction to market prices; in
the latter, the flexible loads are controlled by an independent
aggregator. For both scenarios, we show that, when users
are price-takers, any competitive equilibrium is efficient: the
players’ selfish responses to prices coincide with a socially
optimal policy. Moreover, the price process is the same in all
scenarios. For the numerical evaluation of the properties of
the equilibrium, we develop a solution technique based on
the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM)
and trajectorial forecasts. The forecasts are computed us-
ing wind generation data from the UK. We challenge the
assumption that all players have full information. If the as-
sumption is verified, then, as expected, the social welfare
increases with the amount of DR available, since DR re-
laxes the ramping constraints of generation. However, DR
actions alter the internal states of elastic loads; if the day-
ahead market cannot observe how elastic loads are affected
by DR, a large quantity of DR can be detrimental and leads
to a decrease in the welfare. Furthermore, the DR operator
has an incentive to under-dimension the quantity of avail-
able DR. Finally, we compare DR with an actual energy stor-
age system. We find that storage has a faster response-time
and thus performs better when only a limited amount is in-
stalled. However, storage suffers from charge-discharge in-
efficiency: with DR, prices do concentrate on marginal cost
(for storage, they do not) and provide a better welfare.
1. INTRODUCTION
Electricity markets are developing worldwide, replac-
ing tightly regulated systems by decentralized control
mechanisms based on spot prices [22]. Demand-response
(DR) mechanisms have emerged in order to take advan-
tage of flexible demand in a system where demand is
traditionally considered as inflexible [19]. DR can com-
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pensate mismatches between production and consump-
tion, thus increasing the potential deployment of renew-
able generation by reducing the necessity for regulation
reserve. It can be implemented by having consumers
react to prices [16] or to congestion signals [15].
The authors of [21] present a model of real-time elec-
tricity market that incorporates the dynamic constraints
of generation and the uncertainties dues to forecast er-
rors. The system is composed of two market actors (a
supplier and a consumer) that exchange energy at a spot
price. They show that there exists a competitive equi-
librium, i.e., a price process such that market actors
agree on the quantity of energy exchanged. Moreover,
the market is efficient: for any competitive equilibrium,
the selfish decisions of both market actors coincide with
the hypothetical decisions taken by a social planner that
aims to maximize the sum of every actor’s utility. How-
ever, the equilibrium price exhibits large fluctuations
and is never equal to the marginal production cost.
We extend [21] to model a two-stage electricity mar-
ket that features generation constraints, inelastic loads,
and elastic loads corresponding to a set of DR appli-
ances. Our elastic load model captures several key-
features of controllable thermostatic loads. The loads
are elastic in the sense that it is possible to perform
time-shifts: the consumption of each load can be de-
layed or anticipated, but an object’s consumption can-
not be arbitrarily reduced by augmenting prices. Each
appliance has an internal state representing, e.g., its
temperature. We model individually the fatigue effect
of each appliance by using undesirable states which have
an associated penalty: if a load is delayed for too long,
it reaches such an undesirable state. In practice these
states are only reached in the case of a blackout. We add
a second dimension to the state space: a counter indi-
cates the waiting time before the appliance is allowed to
respond to DR signals, thus modeling mini-cycle avoid-
ance (an appliance that has just been switched on can-
not be switched off immediately). In our numerical eval-
uations we use a mean-field model to keep track of the
empirical distribution of the appliances’ states.
We consider two market scenarios. In Scenario 1, the
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appliances are controlled by the consumer who reacts
to real-time prices by anticipating or delaying the con-
sumption. In Scenario 2 a DR operator controls all the
flexible appliances. She charges a fixed rate to users and
makes a profit by scheduling the appliances when the
market price is low. We show that in both cases, the
market is efficient, i.e., the selfish decisions of players
coincide with the ones of a hypothetical social planner.
We develop a numerical methodology based on the
Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM)
to compute the market equilibrium for a realistic fore-
cast error model. The forecast errors are modeled using
multiple trajectories [17], generated from multivariate
Gaussian random variables with correlation matrices
derived from traces of data from the UK.
Our numerical results show that, for low DR pen-
etration, the gain obtained by using demand-response
is almost linear in the installed DR capacity. For large
DR penetration, if the state of the appliances can be ob-
served by all players, the gain saturates to a value that
does not depend on the appliances’ nature. However, if
the states cannot be observed by the day-ahead market,
increasing the capacity of DR can be detrimental: after
a certain capacity, it decreases the social welfare, as the
consumption of DR appliances is harder to predict. Fi-
nally, we also show that DR operators have an incentive
to under-size the DR capacity.
We also compare DR with classical energy storage [9].
We find that, at low capacity, a storage system offers
better performance than DR because it reacts faster, de-
spite losses due to charge-discharge cycles. However, for
large capacities of installed DR, DR behaves similarly
to a perfectly efficient storage. As such, for large ca-
pacities, DR outperforms energy storage systems, since
these have a charge-discharge efficiency of 70− 90%.
Roadmap. We discuss related work in Section 2.
We present the model, the assumptions, and the main
definitions in Section 3, and the social welfare theorem
in Section 4. We describe our statistical model of error
and our numerical methodology in Section 5. Finally,
we give the numerical parameters and present the nu-
merical evaluation of the model in Section 6. We con-
clude in Section 7.
2. RELATED WORK
The authors of [1] present an overview of DR pro-
grams and their integration within the electricity mar-
ket. They compare price-based and incentive-based pro-
grams and present their benefits (peak reduction, bill
savings, reliability) and drawbacks (deployment cost,
rescheduling, metering infrastructure). New market mod-
els tailored for DR have also been investigated. For ex-
ample, the authors of [20] develop a new market-clearing
mechanism for load-shifting. However, it assumes per-
fect forecast and is limited to a small number of players.
One of the main obstacles in the development of DR
is the fact that users lack intuition about DR both be-
fore the installation – awareness of the advantages and
drawbacks – but also during its use – people do not want
to have to continuously monitor prices [10]. Hence, a
key research topic is the means of presenting DR as a
service transparent to use via smart home controllers or
by having a DR operator with direct control of appli-
ances. Multiple models are proposed, using response to
prices [16] or to congestion signals [15].
DR interferes with demand and has to be taken into
account when studying electricity markets. Demand re-
sponse fatigue and rebound effect are known and mod-
eled in [11] using elasticity coefficients. The response
fatigue is a also a large concern for the DR operator
and the grid regulator. In [14], the authors use a sim-
plified model and find that when the state of flexible
appliances is not taken into account in the control, a
large accumulated delayed load may manifest unexpect-
edly and randomly. In this paper we model the internal
states of each appliance in detail and, in Section 6.3
study whether such an effect continues to occur.
Our appliance model is similar to [12, 15], who also
consider thermostatic controllable loads. A difference
with our model is that we add a second dimension for
modeling mini-cycle avoidance. We also take into ac-
count the undesirable states that could be reached in
blackout conditions. Moreover, we consider that the
elastic loads can be anticipated or delayed, but that
in the long run they consume a fixed amount of energy,
e.g., the average consumption of a heater or cooler. This
is not the case in [15]. In many papers about demand-
response in electricity markets, it is often considered
that higher prices result in reduced consumption [1].
Even if the model has similarities, the papers [12, 15]
study a different problem. They do not incorporate the
market aspects and focus on the problem of the opti-
mal control of DR from the aggregator’s point of view
in response to congestion signals or prices. The devel-
opment of such control algorithms is a popular research
subject, see for example [5] and the reference therein.
Our work builds on various papers about efficiency
in electricity markets (e.g., [21, 9] and the reference
therein). One key contribution of the current paper
is that we are able to handle a more realistic forecast
model in our numerical methodology. The numerical
results produced in [21, 9] were performed by assuming
that the forecast error can be represented by a Brown-
ian motion with stationary increments. We use a non-
stationary model of error that is becoming a standard
for wind forecast. It uses a probabilistic forecast devel-
oped by Pinson et al. [17], where the errors are repre-
sented by a finite number of possible trajectories. Using
branching trajectories, we extend this model to repre-
sent the growing uncertainty of forecasts over time and
the possible observations by actors.
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3. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a two-stage electricity market (day-ahead
and real-time) with three actors: the consumer, the sup-
plier, and the DR operator. The supplier has two roles:
she generates the bulk of the electricity determined via
the day-ahead scheduling and she provides regulation
electricity to compensate for mismatches in real-time.
The consumer aggregates the consumption of a popula-
tion of end-users. The controllable demand of end-users
is managed by the DR operator who uses the flexibility
of the controllable appliances as a means to perform ar-
bitrage on the real-time electricity market. The role of
the DR operator can be assumed by the consumer, or
by an independent actor. In Section 6, we will explore
two type of controllable loads: fridges and boilers.
3.1 Two-stage Electricity Markets
Two-stage electricity markets are used to determine
the price of electricity supplied to the consumers. In the
day-ahead stage, the actors use forecasts of consump-
tion and of renewable production to schedule the bulk
production for the next day. In the real-time stage, last-
minute decisions are taken to compensate mismatches.
We start from the day-ahead market of [4]. The fore-
cast demand for the next day at time t is used to set the
scheduled production gda(t). The scheduled production
incorporates both renewable energy (volatile) and con-
ventional energy sources. The forecast demand has two
components: the non-controllable demand dda(t) and
the controllable (flexible) demand fda(t). An additional
fixed quantity rda is produced as a precaution against
forecast errors. Thus, in the day-ahead market the ac-
tors agree to trade an amount gda(t)+fda(t) the next
day at time t at a price pda(t), where gda(t):=dda(t)+rda.
The real-time market deals with the inevitable mis-
matches that arise from forecast errors. Thus, at time t
the end-users express a total aggregated non-controllable
demand Da(t) = dda(t) + D(t) and controllable (flexi-
ble) demand F a(t) = fda(t)+F (t). The quantities D(t)
and F (t) are the real-time components of the demand,
and they can be positive or negative. While D(t) is
given by nature, F (t) can be controlled to some extent,
depending on the state of the controllable appliances
and on the control signal decided by the DR operator.
The supplier deploys real-time production G(t) > 0
in order to compensate for mismatches. This part of
the generation comes from conventional sources, and is
subject to ramping constraints. The total amount of
produced electricity at time t is thus Ga(t) = fda(t) +
gda(t) + Γ(t) +G(t), where Γ(t) is the forecast error of
renewable sources (i.e., the difference between actual
and forecast production). The energy produced in real-
time is traded at price P (t) at time t.
In this paper, we study the effect of demand-response
on the real-time market. We assume that the market
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Figure 1: Markov model of an appliance. Each
state is characterized by a tuple (s, x, y), with
s ∈ {on, off}. The x-axis represents the internal
state (e.g., temperature). The y-axis is the time
before the device can be switched on or off.
actors are price takers: they strategically define their
actions based on prices, but they cannot influence these
prices. Moreover, we assume that the market actors
base their decisions at time t on the knowledge of past
data and actions (up to time t) and the statistics of
future data. This knowledge is shared by all actors,
unless otherwise specified. In our mathematical model,
this means that there exists a filtration (Ft) such that
the decision processes are adapted to this filtration.
3.2 Controllable Appliance Model
We consider N appliances that can be controlled via
demand-response. Their maximum aggregated power
consumption is denoted Pon. At any time step, each ap-
pliance is fully characterized by its state i = (s, x, y) ∈
M. The state space is defined as M = {on, off} × Z×
{0, . . . , Ymax}, where
• s ∈ {on, off} indicates whether the appliance is
on, in which case it consumes a power Pon/N , or
whether it is off, in which case it consumes 0; if
s = on then we denote by s¯ = off and vice-versa;
• x ∈ Z reflects the internal state of the appliance,
e.g., the temperature in the case of a fridge;
• y ∈ {0, . . . , Ymax} represents the amount of time
that needs to pass before the device can react to
demand-response. The device can be switched from
on to off (or vice-versa) only if y = 0. Moreover,
as soon as the state is switched as a result of a
demand-response action, the value y jumps from 0
to Ymax. By accounting for y, we avoid operation
in mini-cycles which might damage the appliance.
In Figure 1, we represent the Markov chain that gives
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the evolution of the state of an appliance. Each node
on the diagram corresponds to a possible state, with
• s = on for the nodes in the upper rectangle and
s = off for the ones in the lower rectangle,
• x is given by the position on the x-axis, and
• y is given by the corresponding y-axis.
Any state i = (s, x, y) has a horizontal transition to a
neighboring state (on, x+1, y) if s = on and (off, x−1, y)
if s = off. The probability of this horizontal transition
is γs if y > 0, or (1 − ai)γs if y = 0. We consider
that γon is typically larger than γoff . This allows to
model the different speed at which the internal state of
the appliance evolves when it is on or off (e.g., a fridge
spends less time on than off). When y > 0, we add a
vertical transition to a state (s, x, y−1), which decreases
the y counter with a certain probability θs.
We partition the state space into “responsive” states
M1 def.= {(s, x, y) : y = 0} and “non-responsive” states
M2 = M\M1. A demand-response action is defined
as a vector of probabilities a = (ai)i∈M indexed on the
states. For a state i = (s, x, y), ai is the probability
that an appliance switches its s state:
• If the appliance is in the responsive state (s, x, 0), its
state becomes the non-responsive state (s¯, x, Ymax).
• If the state is non-responsive, the action has no effect.
We consider that if the same action a is sent to two ap-
pliances, their transitions are independent. Moreover,
the effect of the actions is applied after the horizontal
transitions. The actions are represented as thick dotted
transitions in Figure 1.
The appliance remains in the same state with the
probability that none of the transitions previously de-
scribed occur: 1− γs if y = 0 and 1− γs − θs if y > 0.
These self-transitions are not represented in Figure 1
for the sake of readability. The transition probability of
an appliance from state i to state j can be written:
pi(i, j, α) = P (m(t+1) = j|m(t) = i, ai(t) = α)
= (1− α)pi(i, j, 0) + αpi(i, j, 1). (1)
Some states of the appliance are undesirable, e.g., if
the internal temperature of a fridge is too high or too
low. We model this by associating a penalty with cer-
tain values of x. Specifically, as long as x ∈ {0 . . . Xmax},
this penalty is 0. When x < 0 or x > Xmax, the
penalty is proportional to the gap between x and the
desirable states. Explicitly, we define a penalty vector
κ = (κi)i∈M indexed by the states i = (s, x, y):
κi =
0 if x ∈ {0, . . . , Xmax}−δ · x/Xmax if x < 0
δ · (x−Xmax)/Xmax if x > Xmax
for some positive constant δ > 0.
When there is no DR, the appliance automatically
switches on or off just before it reaches an undesirable
state. In this specific scenario there is no penalty.
3.3 Mean-field Approximation
The role of each DR appliance is symmetrical. Hence,
the state of the appliances is fully characterized at time
t by an occupancy measure MN (t) = (MNi (t))i∈M,
where MNi (t) is the fraction of appliances that are in
state i at time t. We represent this occupancy measure
as a row vector (of infinite dimension). Unless otherwise
specified, initially, all actors know MN (0) = M0.
We consider that the number of flexible appliances N
is large. It is shown in [7, Section 3.1] that, as N grows,
the MN (t) goes to M(t), which evolves as:
Mj(t+ 1) =
∑
i∈M
Mi(t)pi(i, j, ai(t)). (2)
Moreover, as N goes to infinity, the optimal control for
the mean field limit M is asymptotically optimal for the
system with a finite number of appliances [7, 8].
We denote by Π0 and Π1 the two matrices:
Π0(i, j) = pi(i, j, 0) and Π1(i, j) = pi(i, j, 1)− pi(i, j, 0).
Using Equation (1), we can write the evolution of the
occupancy measure as
Mj(t+ 1) =
∑
i∈M
Mi(t)Π
0(i, j) +
∑
i∈M
Mi(t)ai(t)Π
1(i, j).
In what follows we assume that the occupancy measure
M(t) can be fully observed at t. Thus, we replace a(t)
by a more convenient control U(t), Ui(t) = Mi(t)ai(t).
Formally, we define the set XU of processes (U(t)) such
that M(0) = M0 and for all t:
M(t+ 1) = M(t)Π0 + U(t)Π1, (3)
Ui(t) ∈ [0;Mi(t)] ∀i ∈M (4)
The two controls a and U are equivalent in the fol-
lowing sense: a process (M(t),M(0) = M0) describing
the evolution of the occupancy measure can be obtained
via (2) using a control process (a(t)) if and only if there
exists U ∈ XU such that Ui(t) = Mi(t)ai(t) for all t, i.
These equations remain valid if the same actions a(t)
are sent to all appliances, or if each individual received
an action. In that case, a(t) is the average over all ac-
tions. See the discussion in [7, Section 5.1].
Finally, the power consumption and penalty, defined
in §3.2, can be expressed as scalar products1 with M(t):
• The power consumption of flexible appliances is
F a(t) = fda(t) + F (t) = PonM(t) · ς>, (5)
where the row vector ς = (ςi)i∈M is such that ςi=1
if i is an on state and ςi=0 otherwise.
• The total penalty at time t is
M(t) · κ>. (6)
1For two row vectors x and y, y> denotes the transpose of
y and x · y> is the scalar product between x and y.
4
3.4 Market Actors
We now describe the market actors and their objec-
tives in two different scenarios. In the first scenario,
the consumer also manages the flexible demand. Based
on the current or anticipated market prices and on the
blackout cost she decides whether to anticipate or de-
lay a flexible load. The amount of flexible load close
to undesirable states also influences this decision. In
the second scenario, the DR operator is a stand-alone
market actor that directly buys energy from the market.
3.4.1 Scenario 1: Consumer Controls DR Actions
The consumer controls the quantity of energy ED(t)
purchased on the real-time market at time t. In this
scenario, she also manages the the flexible demand F (t)
by influencing the state of the flexible appliances. The
payoff of the consumer at time t is a sum of three terms:
• We consider linear utilities of satisfied non-controlled
consumption vmin{Da(t), ED(t) + gda(t) − F (t)}
and of satisfied controlled consumption v′F a(t).
• The disutility of a blackout is expressed as a sum of
two terms: a linear term in the amount of unsatis-
fied non-controllable demand −cbo(Da(t) + F (t) −
ED(t)− gda(t))+ and a penalty of pushing control-
lable demand in undesirable states −M(t) · κ> de-
fined in (6). As the consumer aggregates many indi-
viduals, she may curtail only part of their demand.
For example, this corresponds to interrupting the
service for a neighborhood in case of insufficient re-
sources, rather than interrupting an entire city. We
treat controllable demand differently, since it is ac-
tively interrupted or encouraged to consume.
• The amount of money spent on buying energy on
the two markets at prices P (t) and pda(t) is cap-
tured as −P (t)ED(t)− pda(t)(gda(t) + fda(t)).
To summarize, the total payoff of the consumer is
W totD (t) := vmin{Da(t), ED(t)+gda(t)−F (t)}+v′F a(t)
− cbo(Da(t)+F (t)−ED(t)−gda(t))+ −M(t) · κ>
− P (t)ED(t)− pda(t)(gda(t)+fda(t)).
We strip away all the terms that are not controllable in
real-time. Taking into account (5) and (6), the real-time
component of the payoff is:
WD(t) = M(t) · (v′Ponς − κ)> − P (t)ED(t) (7)
−(v+cbo)(ED(t)−D(t)−PonM(t) · ς>+fda(t)+rda)−.
where x− = max(−x, 0), for any real number x.
In the real-time market the consumer maximizes her
expected payoff over the duration T of a day, given the
scheduled day-ahead decisions. Her objective is
arg max
ED,U∈XU
(Ft)−adapted
WD, where WD := E
[
T∑
t=0
WD(t)
]
.
The supplier sells a quantity ES(t) on the real-time
market, and produces G(t) subject to the following con-
straints at each time t:
1. the sold quantity cannot exceed the produced quan-
tity, i.e., ES(t) ≤ G(t) + Γ(t),
2. the real-time production has ramping limitations
ζ− < 0 and ζ+ > 0: ζ− ≤ G(t′)−G(t)t′−t ≤ ζ+, ∀t′ > t.
We denote the set of processes (ES(t), G(t)) that satisfy
these constraints by XS . Thus, taking into account the
marginal generation cost of the day-ahead production
cda and that of the real-time production c, the payoff of
the supplier is:
W totS (t) = (p
da(t)− cda)(fda(t) + gda(t))
+ P (t)ES(t)− cG(t).
Removing the terms that are not controllable in real-
time, this payoff becomes
WS(t) = P (t)ES(t)− cG(t). (8)
Finally, the supplier maximizes her expected payoff
arg max
(ES ,G)∈XS
(Ft)−adapted
WS , where WS := E
[
T∑
t=0
WS(t)
]
.
Dynamic Competitive Equilibrium. We recall the no-
tion of dynamic competitive equilibrium [4, 21].
Definition 1. A dynamic competitive equilibrium
(P e, EeD, E
e
S , G
e, Ue) is a set of (Ft)-adapted price and
control processes that satisfy:
(EeD, U
e) ∈ arg max
ED,U∈XU
WD, (9)
(EeS , G
e) ∈ arg max
(ES ,G)∈XS
WS , (10)
EeD = E
e
S . (11)
In the above definition, (9) means that (EeD, U
e) con-
stitutes an optimal control from the selfish consumer’s
perspective. Similarly, (10) states that (EeS , G
e) is opti-
mal from the supplier’s perspective. Finally, (11) is the
market constraint. Note that in (9), the consumer is
not subject to the supplier’s constraints and vice-versa
for (10). See [4] for a discussion.
3.4.2 Scenario 2: Standalone DR operator
In this scenario, we consider that end-users are charged
at two different retail prices per energy unit: one for
the non-controllable appliances, and another one for the
controllable appliances. The bill for the controllable ap-
pliances is collected by the DR operator. The rationale
of the DR operator is that controllable appliances (e.g.,
fridges, boilers) are always operational and that they
consume roughly a constant (predictable) quantity of
energy per day. Hence, from the DR operator’s view-
point, it is as if consumers pay a constant subscription
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fee per month for a provided service (e.g., to keep the
fridge cool). The DR operator has the possibility of
performing arbitrage on the real-time market thanks to
the flexibility of the appliances.
The consumer controls only the quantity of purchased
real-time energy ED(t) for serving the non-controllable
demand. In this scenario, her payoff at each time t is:
W totD (t) :=vmin(D
a(t), ED(t) + g
da(t))+
− cbo(Da(t)− ED(t)− gda(t))+
− [P (t)ED(t) + pda(t)gda(t)].
The real-time component of the consumer’s payoff is
WD(t)=−(v+cbo)(ED(t)−D(t)+rda)−−P (t)ED(t). (12)
The DR operator is an independent actor that con-
trols the real-time consumption of controllable demands
F (t). On the real-time market, when F (t) < 0, she acts
as a virtual energy supplier and gets payed for generat-
ing “nega-Watts”. She generates revenue via arbitrage
on the real-time market. Her payoff function is
W totF (t)=− pda(t)fda(t)−P (t)F (t)+v′F a(t)−M(t)·κ>.
By Equation (5), F (t) = PonM(t)κ
T − fda(t). Hence,
her real-time controllable payoff is
WF (t)=−P (t)PonM(t) · ς>+M(t) · (v′Ponς−κ)> (13)
The DR operator maximizes her expected payoff subject
to (Ft)-adapted feasible controls U ∈ XU , specifically:
arg max
(U)∈XU
(Ft)−adapted
WF , where WF := E
[
T∑
t=0
WF (t)
]
.
The supplier behaves the same way as in the previous
scenario and has the same payoff (8).
A similar definition of a dynamic competitive equi-
librium can be written in this scenario. A competitive
equilibrium is now the tuple (P e, EeD, F
e, EeS , G
e, Ue).
The difference with respect to the previous case is that
the consumer who was adjusting the amount of bought
energy via the real-time flexible demand F e now needs
to pay for F e(t) = PonM
e(t) · ς> − fda(t) at the price
of the real-time market as a form of virtual energy gen-
eration. The market constraint (11) becomes
EeS(t) = E
e
D(t) + F
e(t) for all t. (14)
4. SOCIAL WELFARE THEOREM
In both presented scenarios we compute the social
welfare as the sum of the actors’ payoffs when the mar-
ket clearing constraint is satisfied. In the case of a stan-
dalone DR operator (Scenario 2), the total payoff is the
sum of Equations (8), (12) and (13). It is equal to
Wtot(t) := −(v+cbo)(ED(t)−D(t)+rda)−−cG(t) (15)
+M(t)·(v′Ponς−κ)> + P (t)(ES(t)−ED(t)−F (t)).
When the market constraints (14) are satisfied, the bought
energy is equal to the sold energy at each time step.
Hence, the price disappears from the total welfare.
A socially optimal allocation maximizes the total ex-
pected payoff. As Wtot(t) is increasing in ES(t), we
can further simplify (15). Taking into account the con-
straints on ES(t), we get that ES(t) = G(t)+Γ(t) max-
imizes Wtot(t). Using (14) to express ED and denoting
the random (uncontrolled) component of the social wel-
fare by Z(t) := Γ(t) − D(t) + fda(t) + rda, a socially
optimal allocation maximizes the total expected payoff:
W ′tot(t) =−(v+cbo)(G(t) + Z(t)−PonM(t) · ς>)−
+M(t) · (v′Ponς−κ)> − cG(t). (16)
We call (G∗, U∗) a socially optimal allocation if it is
a solution to the following problem:
arg max
G∈XS , U∈XU are (Ft)-adapted
E
[
T∑
t=0
Wtot(t)
]
(17)
A direct computation shows that the total welfare is
the same in Scenario 2. This implies that the socially
optimal allocations are the same in both scenarios.
The following important result holds. It is proved in
Appendix A.
Theorem 1. If (P e, EeD, E
e
S , G
e, Ue) is a dynamic com-
petitive equilibrium in Scenario 1, then the allocation
(Ge, Ue) is socially optimal.
Similarly, if (P e, EeD, F
e, EeS , G
e, Ue) is a dynamic
competitive equilibrium in Scenario 2, then the alloca-
tion (Ge, Ue) is socially optimal.
5. NUMERICAL SOLUTION
OF THE PROBLEM
In the rest of this paper we compute numerically the
equilibrium prices and welfare given by Theorem 1. To
this end we use a specific model for the random compo-
nent Z(t) that is both tractable and realistic.
5.1 Branching Trajectory Forecasts
We use discrete time and evaluate the model of Sec-
tion 3 over a period of 24h. Each time slot represents
a five minute interval [18]. Hence, the real-time market
lasts for T = 288 time slots.
Inspired by the methodology of Pinson et al. [17], we
assume that the forecast error process Z can be rep-
resented by a finite number of 2τ trajectories. For a
trajectory ω ∈ {1 . . . 2τ}, the value of the forecast error
at time t is denoted Zω(t). To model the fact that the
forecast for the near future (e.g., the next hour) is more
accurate than the forecast for a distant future (e.g., 12
hours from the present), we consider that the possible
trajectories for the forecast error coincide initially be-
fore separating in distinct branches at certain moments
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Figure 2: Example of possible trajectories of the
forecast errors. To ease the presentation, this
example has only eight trajectories. The nu-
merical results of Section 6 use 512 trajectories.
These trajectories are generated using data from
the UK (see §6.1).
{t1 . . . tτ}. Thus, over time the number of branches in-
creases exponentially: between times tk−1 and time tk,
there are 2k possible such branches of the forecast er-
rors. We consider that initially, between times t0 = 0
and t1, there are two equally likely branches: the odd
trajectories and the even trajectories.
At each time tk, each group of trajectories separates
into two equiprobable groups of trajectories. Formally,
between tk−1 and tk, all trajectories ω that have the
same remainder modulo 2k share the same values:
∀ω < 2τ − 2k,∀t ∈ [tk−1; tk] : Zω(t) = Zω+2k(t). (18)
An example of trajectory is represented in Figure 2.
For more clarity, we only represent eight trajectories.
In the rest of the paper, the numerical evaluations use
512 trajectories. On this figure, we see that before t1 :=
4.5h, there are two possible forecast errors (the “odd”
and “even” trajectories) Between t1 and t2 = 12h, there
are four branches. After t2, all trajectories are distinct.
These trajectories are generated using the covariance
of real forecast errors in the UK. The methodology and
the algorithm used will be described in §6.1.
5.1.1 Observability assumptions
We assume that at each of the branching instants tk,
players can observe the forecast error and can know on
which branch the system is evolving at tk. However,
they cannot predict which branch the forecast errors
will follow after tk. For example, a time t1 = 4.5h,
players can observe if the forecast error is one of the four
odd (Z1, Z3, Z5, Z7) or one of the four even trajectories.
The only information about the future that they have
is that each trajectory is equiprobable.
The set of control variables (G, U ,. . . ) is restricted
to the set of admissible controls, which are the sequence
of causal decisions: a decision taken at time t can use
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Figure 3: Example of an admissible control for G
corresponding to the forecast errors of Figure 2.
the information available at time t as well as the statis-
tics about future trajectories but not the exact future
realization of the forecast errors. Using our observation
model, this means an admissible control for G and U
is a sequence of values Gω(t) and Uω(t) that satisfies
the generation and DR constraints (3) such that for all
ω < 2τ − 2k and all t ∈ [tk; tk+1]:
Gω(t) = Gω+2
k
(t); Uω(t) = Uω+2
k
(t). (19)
For example, if the forecast error is represented by
the trajectories of Figure 2, an example of admissible
control for G is depicted in Figure 3. This control is
causal. At time t0 = 0 it knows that the forecast error
may follow one of the two branches. The chosen control
for the interval [0; t1] is a compromise that yields the
best average performance. At the observation point t1,
players observe whether the branch that was followed
was that of an odd or of an even trajectory. Since each
branch separates again in two branches, there are two
causal sequences of controls for the interval [t1; t2] that
can be applied, depending on the observations made at
time t1. Similarly, at time t2 the four possible observa-
tions lead to four possible decisions.
5.2 Casting the Stochastic Problem into Cou-
pled Deterministic Problems using ADMM
To compute the equilibrium, we use an optimiza-
tion algorithm called the alternating direction method of
multipliers (ADMM) [2]. ADMM is an iterative process
to solve deterministic constrained maximization prob-
lems with concave2 objective and linear constraints:
max
x∈Rd,z∈Re
f(x) + g(z) subject to Ax+Bz = c, (20)
where f and g are two concave functions that take real
values or −∞; A and B are two matrices of size d× dx
and d× dz; and c is a vector of size d.
2ADMM is usually presented as a solution to solve convex
minimization problems. In this paragraph, we keep the con-
cave maximization formulation of Section 3.
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Let ρ > 0. For each (x, z, λ) ∈ Rdx+dz+d, the aug-
mented Lagrangian Lρ(x, z, λ) is defined as:
Lρ(x, z, λ) = f(x) + g(z)− ρ
2
‖Ax+Bz+λ−c‖2. (21)
ADMM performs the following iterations at step k+ 1:
xk+1 := arg max
x
Lρ(x, z
k, λk) (22)
zk+1 := arg max
x
Lρ(x
k+1, z, λk) (23)
λk+1 := λk +Ax
k+1 +Bzk+1 − c, (24)
where x1, z1 and λ1 have been initialized to any vector
of the proper size.
It is shown in [2] that under very general assump-
tions, the ADMM iterations converge to a solution of
the optimization problem (20), regardless of the initial
conditions. ADMM also converges when f or g are not
strictly concave and when they take infinite values.
The social maximization problem (17), is a stochastic
optimization problem where the expectation is taken
over all possible forecast processes. As we assume that
the forecast errors can be represented by a finite number
of trajectories, this problem can be written
arg max
G,U∈admissible
∑
ω
Wtot(G
ω, Uω).proba(ω), (25)
where the set admissible controls G,M denotes controls
that satisfy generation constraints XS , DR constraints
XU , as well as causality constraints (19).
In particular, Equation (19) implies that the decisions
taken at a time t depend only on the information up
to time t. As such, they are a compromise between
the possible optimal decisions taken by a hypothetical
omniscient controller that can observe the future.
5.3 Equilibrium Computation using ADMM
The formulation of ADMM, given by Equation (20),
requires the optimization space to be partitioned into
two groups of variables with no objective functions that
depends on both groups, like h(x, z). To perform this
separation, we enlarge our optimization space. In addi-
tion to the original variables Gω(t), Mω(t) and Uω(t),
we add, for each t < T and ω, the variables M
ω
(t),
G
ω
(t), Gω(t), EωD(t), E
ω
F (t), E
ω
S (t), U
ω(t), U
ω
(t) and
the linear constraints given by Equation (19) and
M(t+ 1) = M(t)Π0 + U(t)Π1; M(t)=M(t); (26)
U(t)=U(t);U(t)=M(t)−U(t);EF (t)=PonM(t)·ς>(27)
G(t) = G(t) = G(t); G(t) = ES(t). (28)
The first group of variables (the “X variables”) con-
tains the variables Mω(t), Uω(t) and U
ω
(t), Gω(t). The
corresponding objective function f(M,U,U,G) is:∑
t,ω
Mω(t) · (v′Ponς−κ)>−cGω(t)+Pos(Uω, Uω), (29)
where Pos(x, x′) = 0 if all coordinates of the vectors x
and x′ are non-negative and −∞ otherwise.
The second group of variables contains the variables
M , U , G, G, ED, EF , ES . The corresponding objective
function g(U,M,G,G,ED, EF , ES) is equal to:∑
t,ω
−(v+cbo)ED(t)− + Pos(ζ+ −Gω(t+1) +Gω(t))
+ Pos(Gω(t+1)−Gω(t)− ζ−)
+ Equal0(EωS (t) + Z
ω(t)− EωD(t)− EωF (t)) (30)
where Equal0(x) = 0 if all coordinates of x equal 0 and
−∞ otherwise.
5.4 Analysis of the ADMM Algorithm
When the constraints given by Equations (26-27) and
the two terms Pos(·) of Equation (29) are satisfied, the
evolution of M(t), given by Equation (3) is respected.
Similarly, the constraints given by (28) and the two
term Pos(·) of Equation (30) ensure that the ramping
constraints of G are satisfied.
This implies that our algorithm converges to the set of
socially optimal allocations. Moreover, it also computes
competitive equilibria. The following theorem summa-
rizes these results. It is proved in Appendix B.
Theorem 2. Let EkD, E
k
S , G
k, Uk be the values after
the kth iteration and let (λkG)
ω(t) be the multipliers as-
sociated with the constraints EωS (t) = G
ω(t). Then:
(i) There exists P such that limk→∞ ρ(λkG)
ω(t) = Pω(t).
(ii) Any subsequence of EkD, E
k
S , G
k, Uk has a subsequence
that converges. Let E∞D , E
∞
S , G
∞, U∞ be its limit. Then
• (P,E∞D +E∞F , E∞S , G∞, U∞) is a competitive equi-
librium for Scenario 1.
• (P,E∞D , E∞F , E∞S , G∞, U∞) is a competitive equi-
librium for Scenario 2.
As a consequence, G∞, U∞ is socially optimal.
(iii) If the maximization algorithm has a unique solution,
the algorithm converges to this solution. If there are
multiple optimal solutions, they form a convex set
and the algorithm converges to this set (for the Eu-
clidean distance).
Remark. Even if we consider piecewise-linear objec-
tive functions, ADMM only requires the objective to be
concave. Hence, the same algorithm can be applied to
more general cost functions and Theorem 2 also holds.
6. NUMERICAL EVALUATIONS
6.1 Parameters and Trajectory Generation
As in [9], we use ζ+=1GW/h, ζ−=3ζ+. We set the
ratio between the blackout cost and the generation cost
to (v+cbo)/c=10. The values of v, cbo and c are normal-
ized so the flexibility provided by fridges L parametrized
below leads to a welfare gain of 100 when Pon is large.
We compare three cases of appliances [13]:
8
• Fridges L (large inertia fridges) – the on period is
Xmax/γon = 60min and the off period is 120min, with
a mini-cycle prevention period Ymax/θon=0 or 20min.
It corresponds toXmax=6, γon=θon=θoff=0.5, γoff=.25.
• Fridges S (small inertia fridges) – same as Fridges L
but with Xmax = 3. The only difference is that the
on period lasts 30min and the off period lasts 60min.
• Boilers – the on period is 4h and the off period is
20h. It corresponds to Xmax = 12, γon = 0.25, γoff =
.05 and θon = θoff = 0.5.
The random transitions of our model of appliance ac-
count for various random evolutions of the internal tem-
perature, for example, due to fridge doors opening. The
second fridge model corresponds to a fridge with a smaller
inertia. It consumes the same average power but has
less flexibility, typically because the temperature dead-
band is narrower. The ratio between the duration of
off and on periods is 2 for fridges and 5 for boilers.
Our numerical evaluation shows that, qualitatively, the
behaviors of the three models are the same.
6.1.1 Trajectory Generation using UK Data
To construct wind forecast errors, we use wind pro-
duction and day-ahead wind production forecast in the
time interval from June 2009 to April 2012, obtained
from the BMRA data archive (elexonportal.co.uk).
We normalize the values of production and forecast to
maintain a constant wind capacity3 of 26GW all through-
out the 1300 days. We obtain 1300 samples of forecast
error trajectories {εd(t) : t ∈ [0; 24h]; d ∈ {1 . . . 1300}}.
εd(t) is the error for the day d at time t ∈ [0; 24h].
A generic method to generate forecast error trajecto-
ries has been introduced in [17]. To generate one tra-
jectory, the authors of [17] compute the covariance Σ of
the process εd (a 288×288 matrix in our case) and then
generate a multivariate normal vector of covariance Σ.
We adapt their method to our case of branching fore-
cast. Algorithm 1 generates a set of trajectories such
that each one has covariance Σ, and such that two tra-
jectories that share a branching point depend on each
other only via their values before the branching point.
These properties are summarized in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. Assume that Σ has full rank. Then,
Algorithm 1 generates a set of trajectories such that:
(i) individually, each trajectory Zω is a multivariate
normal vector of covariance Σ;
(ii) If a subset of trajectories Zi1 . . . Zik is fixed, then
the distribution of another trajectory Zi is the dis-
tribution of a multivariate normal vector of covari-
ance Σ subject to respecting Equation (18).
This theorem is proved in Appendix C. The proof can
be adapted if Σ is not full rank but it is more technical.
3This scenario is envisioned for the UK in 2020, where 20%
of the total electricity consumption is covered by wind.
Input: Covariance matrix Σ, sequence t1, . . . , tτ−1
Output: Trajectories Z1, . . . , Z2
τ
1 A← lower Cholesky decomposition of Σ; t0 ← 0;
2 N1 ← vector of T i.i.d. normal random variables;
3 for k ← 0 to τ − 1 do
4 for ω ← 1 to 2k do
5 Nω+2
k ← [Nω(1 . . . tk); Nˆω+2k ], where
Nˆω+2
k
is a vector of T − tk i.i.d. normally
distributed random variables;
6 end
7 end
8 for ω ← 1 to 2τ do
9 Zω ← A×Nω ;
10 end
Algorithm 1: Generation of 2τ branching trajecto-
ries satisfying Theorem 3. The notation Nω(1 . . . tk)
denotes the first tk elements of the vector N
ω. All vec-
tors are column vectors. [A;B] is the concatenation of
two column vectors to form one column vector.
As a consequence, all trajectories Z1 . . . Z2
τ
are equally
likely. Moreover, as τ grows, the process obtained by
following the branching trajectories “approaches” a nor-
mally distributed random process with covariance Σ.
6.2 Impact of DR Penetration and of the Na-
ture of Elastic Loads
For a given power flexibility Pon, we denote W∗(Pon)
the optimal value of social welfare in Equation (17).
W∗(0) corresponds to the social welfare without DR.
For Pon > 0, the optimal welfare W∗(Pon) depends on
the type of appliance, while W∗(0) does not.
In Figure 4 we plot the “relative” social welfare, i.e.,
the difference W∗(Pon) − W∗(0) as a function of Pon.
We compare the three types of appliances. For fridges
L, we plot both the case without mini-cycle avoidance
(Ymax = 0) and with mini-cycle avoidance (Ymax > 0).
As expected, the welfare is then increasing and concave
in Pon. We observe that, as Pon grows, the social wel-
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
50
100
Power P
on
 (in GW)
(re
lat
ive
) s
oc
ial
 w
elf
are
   
 
 
Fridges L, Ymax=0
Fridges L, Ymax=20min
Fridges S, Ymax=10min
Boilers Ymax=20min
Figure 4: Relative social welfare W∗(Pon)−W∗(0)
as a function of Pon – the available power capac-
ity of DR – for the three types of appliances.
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fare increases and tends to stabilize at the value 100,
regardless of the appliance type or the value of Ymax,
although for a fixed capacity of DR, increasing the mini-
cycle avoidance parameter Ymax diminishes its benefits.
Moreover, for a given appliance type, the gain of using
demand-response is almost linear in Pon for small values
of the installed capacity Pon. In view of the similarity
of the appliance responses, for the rest of the numerical
evaluation we only show the results for the fridges L.
6.3 Non-Observability of DR
The previous figure assumes that the day-ahead mar-
ket is able to predict without error the consumption of
demand-response appliances. In practice, this can be
done because each appliance evolves mainly indepen-
dently of the others. As a results, the relative error
of current load-prediction techniques is less than 1%
[6]. However, one of the concerns of demand-response
is that the presence of a large player that controls many
appliances will introduce synchronization between de-
vices, which will make the behavior of the system less
predictable. For example, a small congestion can cause
lots of DR loads to be delayed, which can cause a bigger
problem in the future because these delayed loads were
not forecast at this date [14].
In this section, we show that when the day-ahead
market cannot fully observe the demand-response state,
adding too much demand-response can be harmful, even
if the real-time market has full information about the
states of appliances. More precisely, we assume that:
• the day-ahead market cannot observe M(0), the
state of the demand-response at time 0. It assumes
that fda(t) is equal to the overall average con-
sumption of all demand-response appliances and
plans the day-ahead generation gda(t) accordingly.
• the actor that controls flexible loads can observe
the states of all DR appliances in real time.
We plot the relative social welfare W∗(Pon)−W∗(0)
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Figure 5: Relative social welfare W∗(Pon)−W∗(0)
as a function of available power flexibility Pon
when the day-ahead market cannot observe
DR’s initial state, compared to the case when
the day-ahead can observe this initial state. The
x-axis is between 0 and 100GW.
for this scenario in Figure 5. When the flexible power is
small (Pon < 10GW), the benefit of demand-response is
close to the one with full information. However, when
the installed demand-response capacity is large, adding
more demand response decreases the total welfare. The
non-observability problem is probably hidden today as
the installed capacity of DR is small but this is a threat
for the future. The results for fridges S and boilers are
very similar and are not shown here.
6.4 Comparison with Energy Storage Systems
Demand-response is often viewed as a virtual energy
storage system, which is potentially cheaper than real
storage systems such as batteries. Instead of charging
and discharging a battery, DR allows to anticipate or
delay the consumption of appliances. In this section, we
compare energy storage and flexible loads. We highlight
two differences: for low penetration, storage provides
more flexibility because it reacts faster. However, at
high penetration, storage is less efficient because of the
energy losses at each charging/discharging cycle.
We consider a storage model like in [9]: the storage
has an energy capacity of Bmax and a maximum charg-
ing and discharging power capacity Cmax and Dmax.
The cycle efficiency is η: only a fraction η of the stored
energy can be retrieved. To perform a fair comparison of
DR and storage, we consider a storage system that has
the same flexible power: we set Cmax = Dmax = Pon/2.
We chose Bmax to reflect the quantity of the energy
stored in DR appliances. Recall that when an appliance
is on, its internal state x increases with probability γon.
When off, its internal state decreases with probability
γoff . Thus, the average consumption of the DR appli-
ances is Ponγoff/(γon + γoff). The internal state of an
appliance that avoids the undesirable states oscillates
between 0 and Xmax. We set Bmax equal to the dif-
ference in consumption between the case where all DR
appliances have an internal state of Xmax and the case
where they are all in state 0. Hence, we take:
Bmax =
PonXmax
γon + γoff
× 5min (31)
With the fridges L model, this implies Bmax=
Pon
2 GWh.
We adapt our ADMM algorithm of §5.3 for the case
where a storage system replaces DR. The results are
reported in Figure 6. We plot the welfare as a function
of the flexible power Pon in four scenarios: presence of
DR but no storage (two dashed curves); or presence of
storage but no DR (two solid curves).
We observe that, at low power capacities, storage pro-
vide higher gain than DR. Two reasons explain this:
• the fatigue effect: because of internal state constraints,
some appliances cannot be switched anymore.
• the mini-cycle effect Ymax > 0: appliances that have
just been switched cannot be switched instantaneously.
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Figure 6: Social welfare as a function of available
capacity of demand-response Pon or of storage.
The storage flexibility is similar to the one of
DR: Cmax = Dmax=Pon/2 and Bmax=(Pon/2)GWh.
For large capacities, the situation is reversed. The wel-
fare of DR and that of idealized storage saturate at the
same value. This value is strictly larger than the one of
70%-efficient storage. For large power capacity, DR out-
performs realistic storage (typical efficiency 70− 90%).
6.5 Price Equilibrium
When there is no demand-response or storage, it has
been shown in [21] that the price process oscillates be-
tween 0 and the choke price v + cbo. In this case it is
never equal to the marginal production cost. The sit-
uation is different in the presence of storage. In [9],
we exhibit two different situations, depending on the
charge-discharge efficiency of storage η:
a) When η = 100% (perfect storage), the prices do in
fact concentrate on the marginal production cost
c as the quantity of storage gets large.
b) When η < 100% (realistic storage), the prices do
not concentrate on c, but exhibit two modes around
c
√
η and c/
√
η.
These results were obtained assuming that the forecast
error is stationary and can be represented by a Brown-
ian motion with stationary increments. We simulate the
same scenarios using our more realistic non-stationary
branching forecast model and our ADMM implementa-
tion. The price distributions are reported in Figure 7.
They confirm that the results of [9] are robust to the
forecast model: for η = 1, the prices concentrate on
c = 1. For η < 1, the price distribution exhibit two
modes around the values
√
η ≈ 0.89 and 1/√η ≈ 1.12.
This price spread is explained by the fact that only
a fraction η of the stored energy can be retrieved. As
a consequence, a storage owner will store energy only if
it can be sold at a 1/η times larger price. In the case
of DR, the energy is virtually stored or retrieved by de-
laying or anticipating consumption. The corresponding
prices are reported in Figure 8. It confirms that the sys-
tem behaves like a 100% efficient storage system (like
in §6.4): even when Ymax > 0, the prices concentrate on
the marginal production cost c.
0 2 4 6 8 10
price
fre
qu
en
cy
0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2
price
fre
qu
en
cy
η=1 η=1 (zoom)
0 2 4 6 8 10
price
fre
qu
en
cy
.75 1 1.25
√
η 1/
√
η
price
f r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
η=0.8 η=0.8 (zoom)
Figure 7: Distribution of prices for a system
equipped with storage of capacity Cmax = 5GW,
Bmax = 5GWh and charge-discharge efficiency
η = 1 or 0.8. For readability, we scale the val-
ues c, v and cbo to c = 1.
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Figure 8: Distribution of prices for a system
equipped with DR appliances Fridges L with
Ymax = 20min. For readability, we scale the val-
ues c, v and cbo to c = 1.
6.6 Incentive to Install Demand Response or
Storage
The storage/demand-response operator makes money
via price arbitrage. An independent storage operator
buys cheap energy and resells it when prices rise. Simi-
larly, a demand-response operator tries to shift the ap-
pliances’ consumption to when the energy is inexpen-
sive. The flexibility brought by demand-response or by
storage results in more concentrated prices. In [9], we
have shown that, to maximize their revenue, indepen-
dent storage operators will underdimension their stor-
age system. In this section, we show that this also holds
for DR operators.
We simulate the same scenarios as in Figure 6 and
we compute the expected revenue of the DR operator
or of the storage operator as a function of the flexi-
ble power capacity. In all cases, this gain reaches a
maximum and then decreases. This maximum is at-
tained at Pon≈1GW for batteries and fridges L with
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Figure 9: Revenue for the DR or storage oper-
ator as a function of the installed capacity. The
studied scenarios are the same as in Figure 6.
Ymax=0. When Ymax=20min, this maximum is reached
at Pon≈3GW. More problematically, the maximum is
attained at a value that is far from optimal for the social
welfare: This entails that even if we disregard installa-
tion costs, the operator seeking to maximize her revenue
will not deploy more than 1GW (or 3GW) of DR ca-
pacity. In Figure 4, we observe that these values of Pon
only lead to a gain representing 40− 60% of the poten-
tial welfare benefit of DR/storage. Hence, to maximize
her revenue, a DR operator’s incentive is to deploy a
suboptimal capacity from a social perspective.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper we studied the effects of demand-response
in a real-time electricity market. We modeled a popu-
lation of flexible appliances that can anticipate or delay
their consumption. This model accounts for fatigue via
undesirable states and enforces mini-cycle avoidance via
an additional dimension in the state space. We showed
that when demand-response is traded by price-taking
actors, the dynamic competitive equilibrium is socially
efficient. We considered a realistic and tractable trajec-
torial forecast error model where trajectories separate
into branches over time. We parametrized the model
using real wind forecasts from the UK. We solved nu-
merically the model by using ADMM. We showed that
if the appliance states are unknown, too much demand-
response can be detrimental. We compared demand-
response to an energy storage system and concluded
that a sufficiently large amount of demand-response is
as beneficial as a perfect storage system. Demand-
response relaxes the ramping constraints of generation
and smooths prices, that concentrate around the marginal
generation cost.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The proof of this result is similar to the one of [9,
Theorem 2] and [21]. We recall the main steps here. We
give the proof for Scenario 1. The proof for Scenario 2
is similar, with three actors instead of two.
Let W(G,U) be the social welfare. For a given price
P , we denoteWD(ED, U, P ) the welfare of the consumer
when she takes the decisions ED, U and byWS(ES , G, P ),
the welfare of the supplier for the decisions ES , G.
We consider the social optimization problem (17) and
we relax the constraint ES = ED. Denoting the cor-
responding Lagrange multiplier by P , the Lagrangian
L(ED, ES , U,G, P ) is equal to:
W(G,U) + E
[
t∑
t=0
P (t)(ED(t)− ES(t))
]
=WD(ED, U, P ) +WS(ES , G, P ).
When the constraint ED = ES is respected, the social
welfareW(G,U) equalsWD(ED, U, P ) +WS(ES , G, P ).
Assume that (EeD, E
e
S , G
e, Ue, P e) is a competitive
equilibrium. It follows that
sup
G,U
W(G,U) = sup
G,U,ES ,ED
s.t. ES = ED
L(ED, ES , G, U, P e)
≤ sup
G,U,ES ,ED
L(ED, ES , G, U, P e)
= sup
ED,U
WD(ED, U, P e) + sup
ES ,G
WS(ES , G, P e)
=W(EeD, Ue, P e) +WS(EeS , Ge, P e)
=W(Ge, Ue).
The last equality holds because a competitive equilib-
rium implies EeD = E
e
S . The one before last equality
holds because each player maximizes his social welfare.
Hence, the allocation (Ge, Ue) is socially optimal.
B. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
B.1 Convergence of ADMM
The problem formulated in §5.3 is a maximization
problem with a concave objective and linear constraints.
Moreover, the problem is feasible, i.e., there exists a al-
location such that all constraints are satisfied (for exam-
ple Gω(t) = G(0), and Mω(t+ 1) = Mω(t)Π1). Hence,
the Slater’s conditions are satisfied and the unaugmented
Lagrangian has a saddle point [3, Chapter 5].
We use the generic notation of §5.2 and denote the
variables after iteration k by xk, zk, λk. By [2, §3.2.1],
the existence of the saddle point implies:
(I) the variables xk, zk approach feasibility:
lim
k→∞
Axk +Bzk = c.
(II) λk converges to a dual optimal point λ∞.
(III) f(xk) +g(zk) converges to the optimal value of the
social optimal problem:
lim
k→∞
f(xk) + g(zk) = sup
x,z s.t.Ax+Bz=c
f(x) + g(z)
The augmented Lagrangian Lρ(x, z, λ) goes to infin-
ity as x or z goes to infinity. Hence, the iterations xk, zk
are bounded and any subsequence xk, zk has converging
subsequence. Let x∞, z∞ be its limit. By (I), (x∞, z∞)
is a feasible allocation. Moreover, by (III), it is socially
optimal allocation. This shows (i) and (iii). Since λ∞
is a dual optimal point, (x∞, z∞, λ∞) is a saddle point.
In particular, (x∞, z∞) is a maximizer of Lρ(x, z, λ∞).
B.2 Definition of the Price as a Multiplier
In our ADMM formulation of §5.3, the augmented
Lagrangian Lρ(x, z, λ), is equal to:∑
t,ω
−(v+cbo)EωD(t)−−cGω(t) + Pos(Uω)+Pos(U
ω
)
+ Pos(ζ+−Gω(t+1)+Gω(t))+Pos(Gω(t+1)−Gω(t)−ζ−)
+ Equal0(EωS (t) + Z
ω(t)− EωF (t)− EωD(t))
− ρ
2
‖Ax+Bz − c+ λ‖2,
where the linear equation Ax + Bz = c represents all
linear constraints (26,27,28) and (19).
Let (λkG)
ω(t) and (λkF )
ω(t) be the multipliers after the
kth iteration of the ADMM, corresponding to the con-
straints EωS (t) = G
ω(t) and EF (t) = F (t) respectively.
The values of Ek+1S and E
k+1
F after the kth iteration
maximize the quantity
−ρ
2
(‖ES −Gk+1 + λkG‖2 + ‖EF − F k+1 + λkF ‖2)
−(v+cbo)ED(t)−, (32)
subject to ES + Z − EF − ED = 0.
A necessary condition for Ek+1S and E
k+1
F to maxi-
mize this equation is that
Ek+1S −Gk+1 + λkG = −(Ek+1F − F k+1 + λkF ). (33)
By Equation (24), the multipliers λk+1G and λ
k+1
F are
λk+1G := λ
k
G + E
k+1
S −Gk+1
λk+1F := λ
k
F + E
k+1
F − F k+1
By Equation (33), these two quantities are opposite.
This implies that after this iteration, the two multipliers
λk+1G and λ
k+1
G are opposite (for all t, ω).
Let (λ∞G )
ω(t) be the limit of (λkG)
ω(t) as k grows. We
define the price process Pω(t) as:
Pω(t) = ρλωG(t). (34)
B.3 This Price Leads to an Equilibrium
We now show that the price given by Equation (34)
leads to a competitive equilibrium for Scenario 2. The
proof is similar for Scenario 1.
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Let us denote by x∞ = (M∞, U∞, U
∞
, G∞), z∞ =
(M
∞
, U∞, G
∞
, G∞, E∞D , E
∞
F , E
∞
S ) and λ
∞, three lim-
iting values of xk, zk, and λk of our ADMM algorithm,
as k goes to infinity.
B.3.1 G∞ Maximizes the Supplier’s Problem
We show that G∞ is an optimal schedule from the
supplier point of view. The vector (x∞, z∞) maximizes
Lρ(x, z, λ
∞). Hence, (G∞, G
∞
, G∞) maximizes∑
t,ω
−cGω(t)− ρ
2
[EωS (t)−Gω(t) + λωG(t)]2 (35)
+ Pos(ζ+−Gω(t+1)+Gω(t))+Pos(Gω(t+1)−Gω(t)−ζ−)
− ρ
2
[Gω(t)−Gω(t)+λω
G
(t)]2 − ρ
2
[Gω(t)−Gω(t)+λωG(t)]2
The quantity ρ2‖EωS −Gω + λωG‖2 rewrites as
ρ
2
(‖λωG‖2+‖EωS−Gω‖2) + Pω · (EωS−Gω)>.
Hence, since G∞ maximizes (35) and satisfies G∞ =
G
∞
= G∞, it also maximizes fρ(G) defined for ρ>0 as
fρ(G) =
∑
t,ω
(Pω(t)− c)Gω(t)− ρ
2
‖EωS (t)−Gω(t)‖2.
An optimal schedule G for the supplier maximizes
f0(G) subject to the generation constraints. Let GS be
an optimal schedule for the supplier and let us show
that G∞ also optimal for the supplier.
For θ ∈ [0; 1], we define an allocation Gθ := θGS +
(1− θ)G∞ and g0(θ) = f0(Gθ) and gρ(θ) = fρ(Gθ). As
G∞ = ES we have
g0(θ) =
∑
t,ω
(Pω(t)− c)Gωθ (t); (36)
gρ(θ) =
∑
t,ω
(Pω(t)− c)Gωθ (t)− θ2
ρ
2
‖GS−G∞‖2. (37)
As Gθ is a convex combination of two feasible alloca-
tion. Hence, it also satisfies the generation constraints.
As GS is optimal for the supplier, the function g0(θ),
attains its maximum in θ = 1. Moreover, this function
is concave in θ and therefore, it has a right derivative in
θ = 0 that satisfies g′0(0) ≥ 0. Similarly, the function gρ
is concave and attains its maximum in θ = 0. Hence, it
has a right derivative in θ = 0 that satisfies g′ρ(0) ≤ 0.
It should be clear from the expressions of g0 and gρ,
given by Equations (36) and (37), that g′0(0) = g
′
ρ(0).
This implies that g′0(0) = 0. Hence, θ = 0 is also an
optimum for g0, which implies that G
∞ is optimal for
the supplier.
B.3.2 DR Operator’s Problem
We showed in §B.2 that the multipliers for EF = F
and for ES = G are opposite. Hence, the optimality
of E∞F , U
∞ for the DR operator under the price P fol-
lows from the same approach as for the supplier (by
comparing the situations ρ = 0 and ρ > 0).
B.3.3 Demand’s Problem
Replacing ES by ED + EF − Z, maximizing Equa-
tion (32) on ED subject to ES + Z − ED − EF = 0 is
equivalent to maximizing
−ρ
2
(‖ED + EF − Z −Gk+1 + λkG‖2
+ ‖EF − F k+1 + λkF ‖2)−(v+cbo)ED(t)−,
without constraint.
As the second term does not depend on ED, this prob-
lem becomes maximizing:
−ρ
2
‖ED +EF −Z−G‖2−P (t)ED(t)− (v+cbo)ED(t)−.
Hence, the optimality of ED for the Demand under
the price P follows from the same approach as for the
supplier (by comparing ρ = 0 and ρ > 0).
C. PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The matrix Σ is the covariance of the forecast error
process ε. As such, Σ is a positive-definite symmetric
matrix of size T × T and has real entries. Thus, there
exists a real matrix A of size T × T such that:
• A is a lower-triangular matrix, i.e., for all t ∈
{1, . . . , T} and s ∈ {t+ 1, . . . , T}, At,s = 0.
• Σ = A×A>.
A is called the lower Cholesky decomposition of Σ. It
also exists when Σ is not full rank.
Let Zω be a trajectory. By construction, the vector
Nω is a vector of T i.i.d. normally distributed random
variables. Moreover, we have Zω(t) =
∑
sAt,sN
ω(s).
Hence, the covariance E [Zω(t)Zω(t′)] is equal to:
E [Zω(t)Zω(t′)] =
∑
s,s′
E [At,sNsAt′,s′Ns′ ] = (AA
>)t,t′ ,
which implies that property (i) holds.
Let us fix a sub-set of trajectories Zω1 . . . Zωk and
let Zω be another trajectory. Let τ be the largest
branching time of Zω shared with one of the trajec-
tories Zω1 . . . Zωk . By construction, Zω = ANω. The
matrix A and the vector Nω can be decomposed as:
A =
[
B 0
C D
]
and Nω =
[
N1
N2
]
,
where the matrices B, C and D have size τ × τ , (T −
τ)× τ and (T − τ)× (T − τ) and N1 has size τ .
By construction, the distribution of Zω given tra-
jectories Zω1 , . . . , Zωk is the distribution of Zω given
Nω(1), . . . , Nω(τ). Let z = B.[Nω(1), . . . , Nω(τ)]. Be-
cause A has full rank, B has also full rank and is in-
vertible. Hence, the distribution of Zω conditioned on
Zω(t) = zt for t ≤ τ is the same as the distribution
of Zω given Nω(1) . . . Nω(τ). Moreover, the former
is the conditional distribution of a multivariate Gaus-
sian random variable of covariance Σ subject to Equa-
tion (18).
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